In The

Supreme Court of the United States

Missouri, Inc.



Decided June 15, 1983

Justice O’Connor, Concurring in part and dissenting in part

Topic: Privacy*Court vote: 5–4
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Joining O'Connor opinion: Justice REHNQUIST Justice REHNQUIST Justice WHITE Justice WHITE
Citation: 462 U.S. 476 Docket: 81–1255Audio: Listen to this case's oral arguments at Oyez

* As categorized by the Washington University Law Supreme Court Database

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JUSTICE O'CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE WHITE and JUSTICE REHNQUIST join, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.

For reasons stated in my dissent in Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, ante p. 462 U. S. 416, I believe that the second trimester hospitalization requirement imposed by § 188.025 does not impose an undue burden on the limited right to undergo an abortion. Assuming, arguendo, that the requirement was an undue burden, it would nevertheless "reasonably relat[e] to the preservation and protection of maternal health." Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 410 U. S. 163 (1973). I therefore dissent from the Court's judgment that the requirement is unconstitutional.

I agree that the second physician requirement contained in § 188.030.3 is constitutional because the State possesses a compelling interest in protecting and preserving fetal life, but I believe that this state interest is extant throughout pregnancy. I therefore concur in the judgment of the Court.

I agree that the pathology report requirement imposed by § 188.047 is constitutional because it imposes no undue burden on the limited right to undergo an abortion. Because I do not believe that the validity of this requirement is contingent in any way on the trimester of pregnancy in which it is imposed, I concur in the judgment of the Court.

Assuming, arguendo, that the State cannot impose a parental veto on the decision of a minor to undergo an abortion, I agree that the parental consent provision contained in § 188.028 is constitutional. However, I believe that the provision is valid because it imposes no undue burden on any right that a minor may have to undergo an abortion. I concur in the judgment of the Court on this issue.

I also concur in the Court's decision to vacate and remand on the issue of attorney's fees in light of Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U. S. 424 (1983).

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